Ideas from 'Potentiality' by Barbara Vetter [2015], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Potentiality: from Dispositions to Modality' by Vetter,Barbara [OUP 2015,978-0-19-871431-6]].
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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
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19023
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Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
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19033
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Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
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19032
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S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
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19036
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The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
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19034
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The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
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19015
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Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
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19012
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The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
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19024
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A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
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19021
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I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
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19016
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We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
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19017
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Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
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19014
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How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
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19030
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Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
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19040
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We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
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19008
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The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
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19029
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It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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19010
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All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
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19013
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Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
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19028
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Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
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23705
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A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
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19009
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Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
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19019
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Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
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19027
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Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
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19031
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There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
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19022
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Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
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19025
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Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
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19011
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If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
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19037
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Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
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19018
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Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
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19020
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Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
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19039
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The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
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19038
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Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
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19026
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If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
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19041
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Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions
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